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Analysis of Internet Topology with Three-Level Components Model 
1. Introduction
F
       One of the current problems which economics is facing is how to analyze the 
rapidly developing Internet. In the 1990s, the Internet became a driving force for the 
growth of the world economy, and the theory of the ` New Economy' was quite popular. 
This paper tries to propose a framework for analyzing the industrial structure of the 
Internet. The connection of the Internet can be broken down into three-level 
components: backbone interconnection, intermediate conveyance, and local access. In 
addition to this, there are two kinds of connections: one-way connection and two-way 
connection. This paper will analyze one-way and two-way connections and attempt to 
integrate them with the three-level components model.
      It will be helpful to explain at this point the key elements on which this paper 
depends. One-way connection is the network structure where one firm needs access to 
another but the reverse does not hold'. One example is: some Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) provide access services to end-users in a retail market and at the same 
time serve as Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) that provide transit services to ISPs in 
a wholesale market, while other ISPs that do not serve as IBPs have to buy transit 
' See Laffont and Tirole, 2000, p.6. Also see the following for details of the one-way connection model: 
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996), Baumol and Sidak (1994), Laffont and Tirole (1994). 
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services from IBPs to provide final services to customers. On the other hand, two-way 
connection demonstrates that customers communicating with each other belong to two 
different local networks and each carrier must buy termination access from the other 
network?. One example is: IBPs have to interconnect at a point of interconnection so 
that end-users on each network can exchange inforrnation3.
       It will be useful here to adopt a ` components model' in order to consider one-
way and two-way connections. respectively. It was Matutes and. Regibeau (1988) and 
Economides (1989) who introduced the components model. The components model 
analyzes how complementary components are combined to produce a valuable system. 
For example, a computer itself will not be of any use to consumers without a 
complementary monitor. That is to say, the computer system is composed of a 
computer and monitor. 
       The paper. consists of the following four sections. After providing a 
preliminary discussion, Section 2 compares one-way and two-way connections by using 
the two-level components model. The main conclusion is that two-way connection is
2 See Laffont and Tirole, 2000, p.8. Also see the following for details of the two-way connection model: 
Armstrong (1998), Laffont, Ray and Tirole (1998), Giovannetti (2002),. 
s In the model analysis below
, we will extend the definition of two-way connection to include one where 
customers can choose a component of services from multiple companies. 
a See Shy, 2001, p.36. Also see the following for details of the components model: Economides and 
Salop (1992), Matutes and Regibeau (1992).
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more socially desirable than one-way connection in that the total output of two-way 
connection is larger than that of one-way connection. This is, first, because of the 
internalization of vertical externalities and, second, because of the action of the 
horizontal substitution effect. 
       Next, Section 3 tries to integrate one-way and two-way connections by using 
the three-level components model. There are two problems to be examined, which are 
actual, problems especially in Japan as we see in Section .1.1. One problem is to 
analyze the social effect of the. entry of vertical integrators into different areas. 
Because most of ISPs have been integrated forward into IBPsd and because: the Internet 
industry is still vertically and horizontally oligopolistic, it is interesting to compare three 
cases: no entry, single entry, and cross entry, The main results are: first, cross entry is 
more socially desirable than no entry in that the total output of the. cross entry model is 
larger than that of the no entry model; second, cross entry is more socially desirable 
than single entry in that the total output of the cross entry model is larger than that of the 
single entry model. 
      The other problem is to analyze the social effect of the timing of the games. 
Since the network structure of local access is in the form of one-way connection while 
that of the global interconnection, or 'peering', takes the form of two-way connection, it 
is interesting to ask whether both should be determined at the same time, or, if any, 
which connection should be determined beforehand. The main results are: first, the 
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local structure of one-way connection and the global structure of two-way connection 
should be determined at the same time in that the total output of the simultaneous model 
is larger than those of the sequential models; second, the local bottleneck of one-way 
connection should be determined afterward rather than beforehand, or in other words 
the global interconnection of two-way connection should be decided beforehand rather 
than afterward in that, the total output of the sequential model where two-way 
connection is determined first is larger than that of the sequential model where one-way 
connection is determined first. Section 4 draws. a conclusion.
1.1. A preliminary discussion
       At this. point, we- will comment on the industrial structure of the Internet, in 
particular that of Japan. The Internet is the global aggregate of various, large or small, 
local networks: The Internet structure can be stunmarized simply as the three-levels: 
the bottom-level local access, the regional or mid-level conveyance, and the backbone-
level interconnections. There are two principal types of Internet providers. One is 
ISP, which provides access services for end-users at a retail level, while the other is IBP, 
which provides transit services for ISP at a wholesale level. Therefore, an ISP has to 
connect to an IBP so that it connects to another ISP. The IBP `peers' with other IBPs 
at network access points (NAPs)6. There is a wide array of ISP ranging from a mom-
s See MacKie~Mason and Varian, 1997, p.30. 
6 See McKnight and Leida, 2001, p.195. 
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and-pop operation offering services to a small number of subscribers in a specific 
location to a national operator that offers access across the whole country. Since the 
cost of becoming a local ISP is very low, competition among ISPs is extremely intense, 
and a significant number of entries and exits of ISPs occur. Besides, the IBP that 
provides backbone services at the wholesale level can be considered as an upstream 
supplier from the viewpoint of an ISP. Most ISPs have been integrated forward into 
IBPs. Fig. 1 illustrates the discussion above. 
       <Fig. 1> 
       The industrial structure of the Internet can be summarized asfollows when we 
focus on the vertical perspectives'. (1) Incentives to vertically integrate on the Internet 
are still strong; particularly, downstream integration is more likely than upstream. 
Thus, the first problem we would like to examine is to analyze the social effect of 
vertical integration i to different areas. (2) The viability of the wholesale market is 
enhanced; particularly, the incumbent facilities-based providers will integrate into the 
developing Internet services. Thus, the second problem we would like to examine isto 
analyze which should precede, the local one-way connection or the global two-way 
connection. To understand these features of the industrial structure of the Internet, it 
seems helpful to use the components model approach because we came to choose 
' See Lehr
, 2001, p.109. 







network components freely as a result of 'unbundling' policies in telecommunications. 
       Here we will briefly comment on the current situation of Japanese Internet 
providers". First, let us begin with the various types of Internet providers. Most 
Internet providers used to be personal-computer-communication companies that did not 
have their own telecommunications facilities. However, telecommunications 
companies that have their own telecommunications facilities have recently increased 
their market share. Fig. 2 illustrates the market share of Japanese Internet subscribers 
from 1998 to 2000 according to the type of . provider'. We can understand that 
telecommunications-type providers have captured a significant proportion of the 
customers of personal-computer-communication companies. This is because price 
competition among the Internet providers has become intense and conventional 
personal-computer-communications companies have lost price competitiveness against 
the large-scale and vertically integrated telecommunications companies"" 
s The figures used here are taken from "The White Paper of the Internet" by the Impress Co., Japan. 
However, we have to be cautious about he result because the figures are largely based on the method by 
which the data is extracted. 
9 It should be noted that since the investigation admits of multiple answers the sum of market shares 
exceeds 100%. 
io One reason why the market share of telephone companies has increased rapidly in recent years is an 
indirect or direct effect of the sudden spread of the Internet service through cellular phones, and in 
particular the success of 'i-mode' of NTT DoCoMo is quite well-known. 
11 In addition, broadband services uch as ADSL and FTTH have been operating since 2000, and a 
competitive-power gap between a company with telecommunications facilities and one without continues 
to widen. 
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<Fig.2>
       In addition, the breakdown of the subscribers' share of telecommunications-
type providers is shown in Fig. 3. Here we can see that the market share of the NTT 
group is high enough to. be almost equal to that of all other common carriers. This is 
because the brand image of the biggest telephone company in the world has a, positive 
effect even as an Internet provider. On the other hand, the foreign-capital providers 
have been gradually increasing the number of subscribers as a result of 'cross-entry'. 
This tendency will continue in the future because Japan Telecom merged with a big 
British cellular phone company, Vodaphone. It follows from the above evidence that 
the Japanese Internet industry is still highly oligopolistic and vertical integrators have 
the competitive edge.
<Fig. 3>
2. The analysis of one-way and two-way connections 
       In this section, we will compare one-way and two-way connections with the 
two-level components model, before going onto the three-level components model.
2.1. The basic setup of the two-level components model
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       This section will explain the basic setup of the two-level components model. 
We assume at -this point that there are two levels of `components', A and B. ' For 
example, component A means an access service from ISP to end-users while component 
B means a transit service between IBP and ISP. It is also. assumed that each 
component has two types, namely Al/A2 and B1/B2. We call the combination of 
components a `system'. Systems are A1B1, A1B2, A2B1, and A2B2. Defining the prices 
of components A, and Bj are Pi and QQ respectively, the price of system AiBj, Sij, can be 
represented as the sum of the prices of components:
       Sii=P;+QQ ; i,j=1,2. (I) 
       Let us assume linear demand functions ofsystems A,Bj, Did, for the sake of 
simplicity, following the previous research into components model. The own effect of 
price to demand is represented by coefficient b, the cross effects are represented by 
coefficients c., d, and e. Accordingly the demand functions of systems are given as 
follows:
D11 =a-bS11+cS12+dS21+eS22 
D 12`a-bS 12+cS 11+dS22+eS21 
D21=a-bS21+cS22+dS11+eS12 
D22=a-bS22+cS21+dS 12+eS 11. (2)
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       The demand functions of components are given as follows: for example, the 
demand of component A1, DAI, is represented as the sum of the demands of systems 
A1B1 and A1B2, D11 and D12; 
        DAI=D11+D12 
        DA2=D21+D22 
        DB1=D11+D21 
        DB2=D 12+D22. (3) 
       At this point, we need further assumptions to simplify the analysis: 
       Al. The constant cross-effects of prices: c=d=e. 
       A2. The non-negative quilibrium prices and quantities: b>3c>O. 
       A3. The zero marginal costs of production. 
       A4, Furthermore, all parameters are normalized by b: b=1. 
2.2. The one-way connection model 
       One-way connection (abbreviated as 1w) demonstrates the case where two 
types of firms exist: one is a dominant firm that monopolizes one level of component 
and the other is a partial entrant. The dominant firm provides Al/BI/B2 whereas the 
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partial entrant provides only A2. The possible interpretation is that the dominant firm 
is an IBP that integrates an ISP and the partial entrant is a disintegrated ISP. 
Customers can choose component A from two providers but component B from only the 
dominant provider. Therefore, there are four kinds of systems as final products, A1B1, 
A1B2, A2B1, and A2B2; firm 1 sets the prices of components Al/B1/B2, and firm 2 sets the 
price of component A2. Fig. 4 (a) illustrates the one-way connection model as 
explained above. 
      <Fig. 4> 
       The firms' profit functions 11, and 112 are given as follows: 
       II1=P1DAI+Q1DB1+Q2DB2 
       112=P2DA2• (4) 
       The first-order conditions of profit maximization can be obtained by 
differentiating profits functions 1 and 112 from prices P1/Q1/.Q2 and P2. The 
equilibrium prices and quantities are shown in Table 1. 
      <Table 1> 
2.3. The two-way connection model 
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       Next, we move on to explain the two-way connection model (abbreviated as 
2w). Two-way connection means that there is no dominant carrier and that firm 1 
provides Al/B1 while firm 2 provides A2/B2. For example, it can be thought that 
component A is. a transit service between IBP and ISP and component B is the 
interconnection service between IBPs. Each component has two types, AI/A2 and 
B1/B2. Component B is compatible with two providers, and B1 can be combined with 
A2 as well as Al to produce the systems A1B1 and A2B1 respectively. The same thing 
can be said of B2. We have here four kinds of systems as final products, A1B1, A1B2, 
A2B1, and A2B2. Firm 1 sets the prices of A1/B1 and firm 2 sets the prices of A2/B2. 
Fig. 4 (b) illustrates the two-way connection model as explained above. 
       The firms' profit functions II1 and H2 are given as follows: 
        rl1'-P1 DA1+QIDB 1 
       II2=P2DA2+Q2DB2. (5) 
       The first-order conditions of profit maximization can be obtained by 
differentiating profit functions 11 and H2 from prices P1/Q1 and Q2/P2. The 
equilibrium prices and quantities are shown in Table 2. 
      <Table 2> 
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2.4. The result of the analysis of one-way and two-way connections 
       Now let us investigate the result of one--way and two-way connections. The 
main conclusions obtained from Tables 1 and 2 can be summarized as the following 
lemmas and proposition". 
    Lemma 1.1 (The components' prices of 1w): Pllw< P21w' Q11w' Q21w 
    Lemma 1.2 (The components' prices of 2w): P12w= P22w = Q,2W = Q22w. 
   Lemma 1.3 (The comparison of components' prices between 1w and 2w): 
          P11W <P12w' P21w (<) P22w iff C-5 (>)0.091, Q11w' Q2' W> Q12w =. Q2 2w. 
        Lemma 1.1 examines the components' prices of one-way connection (1w). 
Since the price of Al that a dominant provider sets is lower than that of A2 that an 
entrant sets, the system demand of the dominant provider is larger than that of the 
entrant. This result demonstrates the advantage of the dominant provider because it 
can set the price. of vertically integrated components taking system demands into 
consideration. Lemma 1.2 examines the components' prices of two-way connection 
(2w). Since two symmetric vertical integrators compete, the prices of all components 
that they set are identical. Therefore, all prices of systems are also identical, and 
12 We can obtain all lemmas and propositions by direct calculation u der the parameter conditions such as 
a>O and 113>c>O. The proof note will be available on request. 
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system demands are symmetric. This is because neither has an advantage in 
competition. Lemma 1.3 compares the components' prices of one-way and two-way 
connections. It is important to note that in the one-way connection model, the price of 
component B is relatively higher because competition does not work at this level; by 
contrast, in the two-way connection model, the price of component B is relatively lower 
because competition works at this level.
Proposition 1 (The comparison of total outputs between lw and 2w):
       Proposition 1 compares the total outputs between the models of one-way (1w) 
and two-way (2w) connections". Two-way connection is more socially desirable than 
one-way connection in that the total output of two-way connection is larger than that of 
one-way connection. Why is two-way connection more socially desirable than one-
way connection? There are two reasons for this. One is the internalization of vertical 
externalities. Vertical integrators can set prices considering the demands of systems 
instead of components. In other words, two-way connection can avoid the problem of 
double marginalization that increases the prices of systems and decreases system 
demands. The other is the action of the horizontal substitution effect. That is to say, 
13 Since prices are higher than marginal costs, outputs are considered socially too few. Accordingly, we 
can regard the total output of systems as an index indicating social welfare. It is thought that he more 
the total output, he higher the social welfare. 
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since there is no firm that- monopolizes components, the price competition i terms of 
systems works effectively and system demands are increased. 
3. An attempt o integrate one-way and two-way connections 
       In this section., we will attempt to integrate one-way and two-way connections 
with the three-level components model, which no studies have ever tried. The 
integrated models of one-way and two-way connections are classified as either 
simultaneous models or sequential models. We will analyze ach type in turn. 
3.1. The basic setup of the three-level components model 
       This section will explain the basic setup of the three-level components model. 
The actual topology of the Internet seems to be an integrated structure of the local one-
way connection and the global two-way connection. Suppose that there are three 
levels of components, A, B, and C. For example, component A is an access ervice 
from ISP to end-users, component B is a transit service between IBP and ISP, and 
component C is -an interconnection service between IBPs. Each component has two 
types, i=1,2, given that there are two areas, j=x,y. On the one hand, a dominant firm 
1X provides three. components, A1dB1x/C1R, and an entrant 2X provides one component 
AU. On the other hand, another dominant - firm 1Y provides three components, 
A1^JC1Y, and another entrant. 2Y provides one component A2y. Fig. 4 (c) 
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summarizes the attempt o integrate one-way and. two-way connections as explained 
above. 
       We can formulate two kinds of models to analyze the integrated model of one-
way and two-way connections. The first formulation is the simultaneous model where 
one-way and two-way connections are determined at the same time. Furthermore, we 
will develop this simultaneous model in the following two ways: first, both dominant 
providers try to integrate entrants operating in different areas; second, only one 
dominant provider tries to integrate an entrant operating in a different area. The 
former is called ` cross entry' while the latter `single entry'. The second formulation is 
the sequential model where one-way and two-way connections are determined in turn. 
There are two kinds of sequential models, One is the model in which one-way 
connection is determined first and two-way connection second. The other is the model 
in which two-way connection is determined first and one-way connection second. In 
the former model the local network structure precedes the global network structure, 
while in the latter model the global network structure precedes the local network 
structure. 
       We assume, as stated earlier, that there are three levels of components, A, B, 
and C, and there are two areas, x and y. In each area, there are two kinds of each 
component, A1J, Bu, Cmn (i,k,m=1, 2; j,l,n=x, y). We make an assumption that end-
users living in area x cannot choose components AlY and B, provided in area y because 
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of regional restrictions; the converse holds for end-users living in area y. For the sake 
of simplicity, we assume that B11=B21 andClri C2,,. Systems are A1xBlxClx, A1xBlxCly, 
A2xB1XClx, A2xB1xC1y, A1yB1YC1y, A1yB1yC 1x, A 2yB1yC1y, and A2yB1YC1x. Defining the 
prices of components Aij,B1s1, and Cmn are Pij, Qhl, and Rmn respectively, the prices of 
system AijBklCmn, Sijklmn, can be represented as the sum of the prices of the components:
Sijklmn=Pij+Qkl+Rmn. (6)
       Let us assume again linear demand functions of systems AijBklCmn, Djjlamn, for 
the sake of simplicity. The own effect of price to demand is represented by coefficient 
b, the cross effects are represented by coefficients c, d, and e. The demand functions 
of systems are given as follows:
Dlxlxlx=a-bS Ixlxlx+cS2xl xlx+dS lxlxly+eS2xlxly 
Dlxlxly -a-bSlxlxly+cSlxlxlx+dS2xlxlx+eS2xlxly 
D2xlxlx=a-bS2xlxlx+cS lxlxlx+dSlxlxly+O'S2xlxly 
D2xlxl y=a-bS2x1x1y+cS ixlxlx+dS2xlxlx+eS l lxly 
Dlylyly =a-bS1y1y1y+cS1ylYlx+dS2ylYlx+eS2y1yIy 
Dlylylx=a-bS 1y1ylx+cS2ylylx+dS yly+eS2ylyly 
D2y1y,y=a-bS2ylyly+cS l l l,+dS2yl yl,+eS 1YlYlY 
D2ylylx=a-bS2ylylx+cS lylylx+dS lylylY+eS2ylyly. (7)
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       Demand functions of components are given as follows; for example, the 
demand of component A1x, DAIX, is represented as the sum of the demands of systems 
A1xBlxClx and A1xBlxCly, Dixlxlx and Dlxlxly; 
         DAIx`Dlxlxlx+Dlxlxly 
         DA2x=D2x1 xl x+D2x1 l y 
         DB1x`Dlxlxlx+D1x1x1y+ D2xlxlx+D2xlxly 
         Dclx=Dlxlxlx+D2xlxlx+ Dlylylx+D2ylylx 
        DAIy =Dlylyly+D1y1y1x 
        DA2y=D2ylyly+D2ylylx 
        DB1y=D1y1y1y+Dlylylx+ D2ylyly+D2ylylx 
        Dc, y=Dlylyly+D2ylyly+ Dlxlxly+D2xlxly (8) 
       Here we make the same assumptions as those in the two-level components 
model, A 1-A4, to simplify the analysis. 
3.2. The analysis of the simultaneous models of one/two-way connections 
       In this section, the simultaneous model of one/two-way connections, ones 
with cross entry and with single entry will be investigated. 
3.2.1. The simultaneous model of one/two-way connections 
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       The simultaneous model of one/two-way connections (abbreviated as 1/2w) 
means that firm 1X provides components A1x/B1x/C1x, and firm 2X provides only 
component A2x. Similarly, firm 1Y provides components Al y/Bly/Cly, and firm 2Y 
provides only component A 2y. 
       The firms' profit functions 111x, 12x, fly, and 112y are given as follows: 
        H1X=PlxDAl x+Ql xDB 1x+R1xDclx 
       112x=P2xDA2x 
       IIly=PIYDA1 y+Q1YDB 1y+R1YDcly 
        hT2y-'P2yDA2y. (9) 
       The first-order conditions of profit maximization can be obtained by 
differentiating profit functions HI, 112x, 111y, and 112y from prices Plx/Qlx/R1x, P2x, 
Ply/Qly/R1y, P2y. The equilibrium prices and quantities are shown in Table 3. 
      <Table 3> 
3.2.2. The simultaneous model of one/two-way connections with cross entry 
       The simultaneous model of one/two-way connections is now developed so 
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that firm 1X merges with firm 2Y while firm 1Y merges with firm 2X. The 
simultaneous model of one/two-way connections with cross entry (abbreviated as 
1/2w+c) means that firm 1X provides components A1x/B1R/C1,/A2y, and firm lY provides 
components Aly/Bly/Cly/A2x. 
      The firms' profit functions Ill,,, Illy are given as follows: 
        Hlx`P1 XDAl x+Q1xDB 1x+Rl xDclx+P2yDA2y 
        j lly=P1YDA1y+Q1yDB1y+RlyDcly+P2xDA2x• (10) 
      The first-order conditions of profit maximization can be obtained by 
differentiating profit functions Ilex, Il1yfrom prices Plx/Q1x/RIIP2y, Ply/Q1y/R1yJP2x. The 
equilibrium prices and quantities are shown in Table 4. 
      <Table 4> 
3.2.3. The simultaneous model of one/two-way connections with single entry 
       The simultaneous model of one/two-way connections i now developed so 
that only firm 1X merges with firm 2Y. The simultaneous model of one/two-way 
connections with single entry (abbreviated as 1/2w+s) means that firm 1X provides 
components A1x/Bjx/C1IA2y, firm 2X provides A2, and firm 1Y provides components 
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A1y/B1y/C1y. 
       The firms' profit functions nix, 112%,1I1y are given as follows: 
         n l x--P 1 %DA 1 x+Q 1 xDB 1 x+R l xDc lx+P2yDA2y 
        112x`P2xDA2x 
        111y-PlyDAly+Q1yDB1y+RiYDc1y (11) 
       The first-order conditions of profit maximization can be obtained by 
differentiating profit functions Zllx, 112x, 111y from prices P1R/Q1x/R1x/P2y, xP1y/Q1y/R1y. 
The equilibrium prices and quantities are shown in Table 5, 
      <Table 5> 
3.2.4. The result of the analysis of the simultaneous models of one/two-way 
connections 
       Now let us investigate the result of the simultaneous models of one/two-way 
connections. The main conclusions obtained from Tables 3 to 5 can be summarized as 
the following lemmas and propositions. 
    Lemma 2.1 (The comparison of components' prices between 1/2w and 1/2w+c): 
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        P ix -' 1/2w__Plyl/2w>P lx 1/2w+c_P ly 1/2w+c ' P2x - l/2w__p2y 1/2w> 2x - 1/2w+c_P2y1/2w+c 
-
       Q lx 1/2w-_Qly1/2w<Q1x1/2w+c_Qly1/2w+c, Rlx 1/2w_Rly 1/2w>Rlx - 1/2w+c_Rly1/2w+c. 
Lemma 2.2 (The comparison of components' prices between 1/2w and 1/2w+s): 
                                    1/2w+s 1/2w 1/2w+s 1/2w 1/2w+s             1/2w 1/2w+s 1/2w.,,       P1x <Plx ' P2x P2x ' Qlx <Q1x ' R1x >R1x 
       Ply 112w >P ly 1/2w+s, P2y1/2w >P2y1/2w+s, Qty1/2w<Qly 1/2w+s , Rly 1/2w >Rly 1/2w+s 
Lemma 2.3 (The comparison of components' prices between 1/2w+c and 1/2w+s): 
       P 1 /2w+c <P 1 /2w+s P 1 /2w+c <P l/2w+s 1 /2w+c 1 /2w+s R 1 /2w+c <R l /2w+s     Ix lx I 2x 2x ' Q1x Qlx lx 1x > 
       Ply1 /2w+c 1 /2w+s, P2y1 /2w+c>P2y1 /2w+s, (fly1 /2w+c >Qly1 /2w+s , Rly 1/2w+ c <Rly1 /2w+s      >I'ly
       Lemma 2.1 compares the components' prices between the simultaneous 
model (1/2w) and one with cross entry (1/2.w+c). Lemma 2.2 compares the 
components' prices between the simultaneous model (1/2w) and one with single entry 
(1/2w+s). Lemma 2.3 compares the components' prices between the simultaneous 
model with cross entry (1/2w+c) and one with single entry (1/2w+s). The calculation 
results are quite complicated, and therefore it would be tedious to comment on each 
result. The most interesting issue is how the prices of A2x and A2y would change after 
the mergers of entrants by dominant firms operating in other areas, which is presented 
in Lemma 2.1. It may be intuitively expected that the prices of merged components 
A2x and A2y are likely to increase because the number of firms decreases. However, the 
result is the opposite. As the consequence of cross entry of dominant firms, the prices 
of merged components A2x and Ay decrease. This is because a kind of two-way 
competition begins to work between areas with the cross entry.
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Proposition 2.1 (The comparison of total outputs between 1/2w and 1/2w+c): 
     ~E~D /2w<EEED /2w+C. 
Proposition 2.2 (The comparison of total outputs between 1/2w and 1/2w+s): 
      C+~~D1/2w <~ Dv2w+s 
Proposition 2.3 (The comparison of total outputs between 1/2w+c and 1/2w+s): 
      EKED l /2w+c >EMED l/2w+s.
       Proposition 2.1 compares the total outputs between the simultaneous model 
(1/2w) and one with cross entry (1/2w+c). Proposition 2.2 compares the total outputs 
between the simultaneous model (1/2w) and one with single entry (1/2w+s). 
Proposition 2.3 compares the total outputs between the simultaneous model with cross 
entry (1/2w+c) and one with single entry (1/2w+s). The calculation results are in line 
with exactly what one would intuitively expect from Lemmas given above. 
Proposition 2.1 states that cross entry is more socially desirable than no entry in that the 
total output of the cross entry model is larger than that of the no entry model. 
Proposition 2.2 states that single entry is more socially desirable than no entry in that 
the total output of the single entry model is larger than that of the no entry model. 
Proposition 2.3 states that cross entry is more socially desirable than single entry in that 
the total output of the cross entry model is larger than that of the single entry model. 
It follows from the above propositions that the larger the number of entrants, the more 
socially desirable.
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3.3. The analysis of the sequential models of one/two-way connections 
       In this section, two kinds of sequential models of one-way and two-way 
connections, namely the one-way-- l st/two-way-2nd model and the two-way-1 1st/one-
way-2nd model, will be investigated. 
3.3.1. The one-way.1st/ wo-way-2nd model. 
       We will consider the sequential model where one-way connection is 
determined in the first term and two-way connection is determined in the second term 
(abbreviated as1->2w). In the first term, one-way connection is solved: firms 1X and 
1Y determine AIJBI,,.and A1y/B1y respectively; furthermore, firms 2X and 2Y determine 
Al, and A2y respectively. In the second term, two-way connection is solved: firms 1X 
and 1Y determine C1, and Cly respectively. 
       The ownership structure of components and the profit functions can be 
represented in the same way as the simultaneous model. The first-order conditions of 
profit maximization can be obtained by differentiating profit functions rI X, II2x,11y, "2y 
from prices P1JQ1X, P2, Ply/Q1y, Pty in the first term, then from prices R1, R1y in the 
second term. The model can be solved by the normal backward-induction. The 
equilibrium prices and quantities are displayed in Table 6. 
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      <Table 6> 
3.3.2. The two-way-lst/ one-way-2nd model 
       We will consider the sequential model where two-way connection is 
determined in the first term and one-way connection is determined in the second term 
(abbreviated as2->lw). In the first term, two-way connection is solved: firms 1X and 
1Y determine Clx and C1Y respectively. In the second term, one-way connection is 
solved: firms 1X and 1Y determine A1x/B1x and Aly/B1y respectively; furthermore, firms 
2X and 2Y determine A2x and A2y respectively. 
       The ownership structure of components and the profit functions can be 
represented in the same way as the simultaneous model. . The first-order conditions of 
profit maximization can be obtained by differentiating profit functions Ilex, 12x, fly, Il2y 
from prices R1 , Rly in the first term, then from prices P1,/Q,,,, P2x, P1 /Q1y, Pty in the 
second term. The model can be solved by the normal backward-induction. The 
equilibrium prices and quantities are shown in Table 7. 
      <Table 7> 
3.3.3. The result of the analysis of the sequential models of one/two-way 
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connections 
       Now let us investigate the result of the; sequential models of one/two-way 
connections. The main conclusions obtained from Tables 3, 6 and 7 can be 
summarized as the following lemmas and propositions. 
   Lemma 3.1 (The comparison of components' prices between 1/2w and 1->2w): 
             P 1/2w-'P 1/2wCP 1>2w __P 1>2w P 1/2w_tj 1/2w<P 1>2w__p 1->2w                Ix ` ly ix - ly ' 2x 2y 2x 2y 
             Q lx 1/2w--Qly1/2w<Qlx1->2w`Qly1->2w, Rlx 1/2w_Rly 1/2w>Rlx1->2w - r,Rlyl->2w. 
   Lemma 3.2 (The comparison of components' prices between 1/2w and 2->1w): 
             P 1/2w_P 1/2w>P, 2->lw_p 2->lw P 1/2w__P 1/2w>P 2->lw-p 2->1w                    ix ` ly x ` ly ' 2x '"" 2y 2x - 2y 
            Q l/2w-_Q1/2w>Q 2>lw`Q 2>lw R 1/2w__R 1/2w<R 2>iw_R2->lw               lx ly ix ly ' lx "- 1y ix ly 
    Lemma 3.3 (The comparison of components' prices between 1->2w and 2->lw): 
               Plx =Ply 1->2w>plx -2->lw_ply 2->lw' P2,1->2w,,,,,p2yi->2w>P2x 2->l _p 2y2->lw 
' 
               Q 1->2w__~ 1->2w>Q2->lw_n 2->Iw 1.->2w =R 1->2w.<R 2->lw_R 2->lw                  lx ly lx '- ly ' lx ly 1x ly 
   Proposition 3.1 (The comparison of total outputs between 1/2w and 1->2w): 
                  >EXEDI->2w EEEDv2w. 
    Proposition 3.2 (The comparison of total outputs between 1/2w and 2->lw): 
         EXIDv2w >EEED2'lw. 
    Proposition 3.3 (The comparison of total outputs between 1->2w and 2->lw): 
                 <EEED2>lw       EY,ED1->2w. 
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J
       Lemma 3.1. compares the components' prices between the simultaneous 
model (1/2w) and the one-way-lst/two-way-2nd model (1->2w). Proposition 3.1 
compares the total outputs between them. Similarly, Lemma 3.2 compares the 
components' prices between the simultaneous model (1/2w) and the two-way-1 st/one-
way-2nd model (2->lw). Proposition 3.2 compares the total outputs between them. 
In the one-way-lst/two-way-2nd model, the prices of one-way connection determined in 
the first term increase while the prices of two-way connection determined in the second 
term decrease, on the basis of the simultaneous model. On the other hand, in the two-
way-lst/one-way-2nd model, the prices of two-way connection determined in the first 
term increase while the prices of one-way connection determined in the second term 
decrease, on the basis of the simultaneous model. Thus, in these sequential models, 
the prices determined first are considered to increase while the prices determined second 
are considered to decrease, compared with the simultaneous model. Furthermore, the 
simultaneous model is more socially desirable than the sequential models in that the 
total output of the simultaneous model is larger than those of the sequential models. 
        Lemma 3.3 compares the components' prices between the one-way- lstltwo-
way-2nd model (1->2w) and the two-way- lst/one-way-2nd model (2->lw). 
Proposition 3.3 compares the total outputs between them. It is also observed here that 
the prices determined first increase while the prices determined second decrease. 
Furthermore, the two-way-1st/one-way-2nd model is more socially desirable than the 
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one-way- l st/two-way-2nd model in that the total output of the two-way- l stone-way-
2nd model is larger than that of the one-way-lst/two-way-2nd model. It follows from 
what has been observed that the local bottleneck of one-way connection should be 
determined afterward rather than beforehand, or in other words the backbone 
interconnection of two-way connection should be decided beforehand rather than 
afterward.
4. Conclusion
       This paper has firstly analyzed one-way and two-way connections with the 
two-level components model and secondly. attempted to integrate them with the three-
level components model. Although the original purpose of this paper was to study the 
network of networks such as the Internet, the analysis framework itself can easily be 
applied to any other vertically industrial structure. Three main conclusions have been 
obtained in this paper: first, two-way connection, is more socially desirable than one-
way connection; second, cross entry is more socially desirable than no entry, and also 
cross entry is more socially desirable than single entry; third, the local structure of one-
way connection and the global structure of two-way connection should be determined at 
the same time, and, if any, the local bottleneck of one-way connection should be 
determined afterward rather than beforehand, or in other words the global 
interconnection of two-way connection should be decided beforehand rather than 
afterward. 
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       Finally we have to refer briefly to two subjects worthy of future research. 
The first is to develop the generality of the analytical assumptions and the second is to 
extend the analytical scope. We have assumed the linear demand functions, following 
the previous research, but will have to assume more general demand functions to 
confirm the robustness ofour conclusions. We have also considered total outputs as an 
index indicating social welfare. However, more precisely, we should calculate the 
social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. In addition, we 
should take account of other social values like the incentive ffects in management and 
the stable supply of services. Next, we have established the model basically keeping 
the Japanese Internet structure in mind but will have to consider the other models 
depending on industrial structures peculiar to other countries. We consider these to be 
subjects for future research.
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Fig.3.. The number of Japanese Internet subscribers 
       to telecommunications corporations
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nikkei2 X'2 prrof nb 1
Proof Note 
for. "Analysis of Internet Topology with Three-Level Components 
Model"
All Lemmas and Propositions in this paper can be proved by direct 
calculations. It would, however, be useful to provide a graphical 
outline of proof for the intutive understanding (by using 
Mathematica), although it need not be included in the manuscript.
Lemma1.1 
self -evident from Tables 
Lemma 1.2 
self -evident from Tables 
Lemmal .3 
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